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Abstract: 
After the 2002 airline mergers in China, no significant airfare increases were found to have 
occurred in a sample of markets served by China Eastern and China Southern. In most of 
the markets that were directly affected by the mergers, airfares in fact declined. This is 
somewhat surprising, especially given the absence of antitrust laws and enforcement over 
the period subsequent to the mergers. Our results, however, do show that market power 
was possibly exercised after the mergers in China Eastern’s hub-to-hub markets.  
 










On 11 October 2002 China’s nine airlines merged into three airline groups: the Air China 
Group, the China Eastern Group and the China Southern Group. The Air China Group was a 
consolidation of Air China (based in Beijing), China Southwest Airlines (Chengdu) and 
CNAC.
1 
The China Southern Group was formed from China Southern Airlines (Guangzhou), 
China Northern Airlines (Shenyang) and China Xinjiang Airlines (Urumqi). The China 
Eastern Group included China Eastern Airlines (Shanghai), China Yunnan Airlines 
(Kunming) and China Northwest Airlines (Xi’an). 
   These airline mergers have resulted in a reduction in the number of competitors, changed 
concentration on routes or at airports, increased multimarket contact, enhanced networks and 
possibly improved service quality, and induced new competitive strategies. Potential market 
power and potential efficiency gains have been associated with these changes. Airfare 
variations reflect one or more of these changes, but it is not easy to identify to what extent 
each of these changes has contributed to airfare changes because of the difficulty in 
measuring these changes and quantifying their effects. In the absence of other significant 
events that could have affected the airlines’ pricing, we can assume with some confidence 
that airfare changes observed after the end of 2002 were most likely due to changes arising 
from the 2002 mergers.  
Market power has been a prime concern of consumers and antitrust authorities. Several 
case studies have focused on mergers in the US airline industry following the merger waves 
of the 1980s, including GAO (1988), Borenstein (1990), Werden et al. (1991), and Kim and 
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 CNAC: China National Aviation Corporation, owned by CAAC and based in Hong Kong (but not directly 
providing air services to and from Hong Kong), was a major shareholder of Dragon Air and Air Macau , and 
through a small subsidiary, Zhejiang Airlines, provided services to and from Zhejiang province. 
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Singal (1993). The absence of airline mergers during the 1990s has resulted in few new 
empirical studies, even after the wave of airline mergers in the late part of the decade.  
Many articles concerning China’s airline mergers have appeared in newspaper and airline 
industry magazines. No published study has as yet systematically investigated the effects and 
policy implications of these mergers. These mergers have conferred on China’s big three 
airlines a joint dominant status in domestic Chinese markets. There was no clear-cut antitrust 
law and no effective antitrust authority during the period of the mergers. Given that China’s 
airline industry has a long tradition of engaging in price fixing, and the difficulty of achieving 
efficiencies in the short run, it could have been predicted that the airlines would likely 
continue this practice after the mergers. A study of these issues should inform the 
development of an effective competition policy in China with respect to airline markets. 
This paper will examine changes in the airfares charged by China Eastern and China 
Southern after 2002 in a sample of their markets. Whenever possible we will seek to infer 
whether market power has been exercised and/or whether efficiency gains were realised in 
these markets. Market power may exist not only in the markets that are directly affected by 
the mergers, but also in markets that do not experience any obvious effects from the mergers. 
For example, the enhanced dominant status of a carrier at an airport resulting from a merger 
may influence airfares in all of the markets out of this airport, including any ―unaffected‖ 
routes. It is therefore suggested that merger effects studies should look at both the ―affected‖ 
markets and the ―unaffected‖ markets.  
In this paper, the effects of the Chinese airline mergers on airfares will be examined by 
considering the following questions:
2
 
1. How have fares changed on average in the sample markets following the mergers? 
                                                 
2
 As will be discussed later, only China Eastern’s and China Southern’s airfare data were available for this study. 
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2. How have fares changed on hub-to-hub markets within an airline group? 
3. How have fares changed out of the airline groups’ major hubs ( Shanghai and 
Guangzhou)? 
4. How have fares changed in market groups with different market structures? 
Section Two will briefly describe the history of China Eastern and China Southern. Section 
Three will present the data and some key variables associated with the mergers. Section Four 
will discuss the methodology used to answer our questions of interest, and Section Five will 
answer these questions. Section Six will conclude.  
2. Profiles of China Eastern Airlines and China Southern Airlines 
2.1. China Eastern Airlines 
China Eastern Airlines was one of the six trunk airlines that separated from the former 
CAAC Shanghai Bureau in June 1988. Shanghai International Airport Company was 
established at the same time by hiving off the airport management function from CAAC’s 
Shanghai Bureau. China Eastern Airlines headquarters are at Shanghai Hongqiao 
International Airport. It was publicly listed in Hong Kong, New York and Shanghai in 1997. 
After the acquisition of China General Aviation Corporation, China Great Wall Airlines 
and Wuhan Airlines in the late 1990s and early 2000s, China Eastern’s base areas covered the 
East China provinces, including Shandong, Jiangxi, Anhui, Zhejiang, Jiangsu, and Shanghai 
Municipality, the two northern provinces of Shanxi and Hebei, and the central province of 
Hubei. China Eastern Air Holding Company (hereafter, CEA Holdings or the China Eastern 
Group) was founded on 11 October 2002 after the acquisition of China Northwest Airlines 
and China Yunnan Airlines. As a result of the consolidation, in October 2002 CEA Holdings 
 5 
 
had total assets of 47.3 billion Chinese yuan (US5.9 billion) with a fleet of 142 aircraft 
providing services on 386 routes. 
CEA Holdings paid nothing for the acquisition of China Northwest and China Yunnan as 
they were both 100 per cent state owned. CEA Holdings represented the state in managing 
these state-owned assets. However, the ultimate goal of the consolidation was to incorporate 
the two acquired airlines into China Eastern, the publicly listed company. As China Eastern 
had been partly privatised, it needed to pay its parent company, CEA Holdings, for the 
acquisition of China Northwest’s and China Yunnan’s assets. This was not accomplished 
until mid-2005. Therefore, within CEA Holdings, the two new members remained financially 
independent from CEA until 30 June 2005, when China Eastern absorbed their assets and 
liabilities after paying 986 million Chinese yuan (US$123.3 million) to CEA Holdings.  
From March 2003, all flights of the new members within CEA Holdings adopted CEA’s 
carrier code ―MU‖. From the beginning of 2003 individual logos on planes were gradually 
phased out and replaced by CEA’s logo. From 8 August 2003, all three airlines jointly 
adopted a new frequent flyer program called ―Eastern Miles‖.  
2.2. China Southern Airlines 
Similar to the birth of China Eastern Airlines, China Southern Airlines was separated from 
CAAC Guangzhou Bureau and declared independent on 26 January 1991. Also in 1997, only 
several months after the public listing of China Eastern, China Southern Airlines Co. Ltd 
succeeded in listing its shares on both the New York and Hong Kong stock exchanges. Its 
shares have also traded on the Shanghai Stock Exchange since 2003. Before the consolidation 
with China Xinjiang and China North, China Southern operated from 11 base cities in south 
and central China, namely, Guangzhou, Wuhan, Zhengzhou, Changsha, Shenzhen, Zhuhai, 
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Xiamen, Guiyang, Guilin, Haikou and Shantou. Most are provincial capitals or business 
centres in their provinces.  
China Southern Air Holding Company (hereafter CSA Holdings or China Southern Group) 
was founded on the same day as CEA Holdings when it announced the acquisition of China 
North and China Xinjiang Airlines. As a result of the consolidation, in October 2002 China 
Southern Group had total assets of 50.1 billion Chinese yuan (US$6.3 billion) with a fleet of 
186 aircraft providing services on 666 routes. 
Members of CSA Holdings unified their carrier code on 1 January 2003 on all their 
domestic flights, two months after the consolidation. China Southern’s code ―CZ‖ also 
applied on all the members’ international flights from 30 March 2003. The new members’ 
logos were removed and replaced by China Southern’s logo since early 2003. Their ticketing 
offices and airport staff across the country gradually merged from the second half of 2003. 
At a meeting on 12 December 2004 the shareholders decided that publicly-listed China 
Southern should purchase the aviation-related assets and liabilities of China Southern North 
Company and China Southern Xinjiang Company. This was completed in 2005, which 
marked the full integration of the airlines. 
3. Data 
3.1. Airfare data  
The airfare data sets for this study come from China Southern and China Eastern. The raw 
data include the number of passengers carried by each of the two airlines, and the average 
airfares (monthly revenue divided by the number of passengers carried) charged by each 
carrier on a given route for a given month from January 2002 to December 2004.  The 
monthly average airfare does not include airport taxes as this amount does not constitute any 
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part of the revenue of the airline, nor any other types of taxes. Note that the average revenue 
is calculated as the monthly average on a given route of a single carrier, and hence is not the 
average revenue for an individual flight. Many of the markets covered by the two data sets 
are associated with the two airlines’ primary hubs—Shanghai3 for China Eastern and 
Guangzhou for China Southern. The route-level airfares for the two airlines cover the 36-
month period from January 2002 to December 2004. As China’s airline mergers occurred in 
October 2002, the data set contains a 10-month period before the mergers and a 26-month 
period after the mergers, enabling us to study any anticompetitive issues that might be 
associated with them. 
It should be noted that there are missing data for some months, either because the airlines 
suspended their services on some routes from time to time, or because of incomplete data 
collection by the airlines themselves (for example, no price information for August 2002 was 
available for China Eastern). If the total service interruption time length of a route, or the 
number of periods with missing data for the route, was more than 12 of the 36 periods that 
being studied, the route was dropped from our analysis.
4
 
                                                 
3 
Shanghai is the only city in China with two airports: Hongqiao and Pudong. Hongqiao has been a domestic-
only airport since 2000, while Pudong has accommodated both domestic and international flights since then. 
Passengers generally prefer to depart and arrive at Hongqiao airport, which is close to the city. In the past few 
years, flights to another domestic city have not consistently departed from one airport because it is largely the 
government’s choice to decide which flights should use which airport, and this decision has changed from 
season to season. For convenience, we treat the two airports equally and assume that they have no influence on 
pricing and customers’ choice. Therefore, if an airline has flights departing from both airports to the same 
destination, or from one city to both airports, the average fares will be computed across both airports to replace 
the raw information for these city-pair markets. 
4
 It should be noted that the analysis in this study is restricted to non-stop routes. This has no serious drawbacks 
as, during 2002–2004, the vast majority of the passengers carried on a flight were origin and destination (O&D) 
passengers. Only a small number of passengers took trips with more than one stop, in part because many 
airports did not provide convenient transfer facilities, and in part because airlines did not have a well-designed 
hub-and-spoke system to increase the number of connecting passengers. 
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The airfare for each route is calculated as a one-way, directional airfare. After screening, 
we have 113 markets for China Eastern, accounting for 29 per cent of the total number of 
markets in which China Eastern Group members operated (computed by the authors based on 
the 2002 information in China Eastern’s financial report). The data from China Southern 
consists of 76 markets, accounting for 24 per cent of China Southern Group’s total markets 
(computed by the authors based on the 2002 information in China Southern’s financial 
report). There are 21 identical markets in these two samples where China Eastern and China 
Southern were simultaneously present. 
In this study the average revenue yield, or the price per kilometre, is used to examine 
pricing trends. The revenue yield is obtained by dividing the average airfare charged by a 
carrier on a given route by the route distance.   
3.2. An overview of China Eastern (MU) and China Southern (CZ) in 2002–2004 
It would be expected that the merger activities would change the structure of the airline 
industry. A simple count of the average number of airlines operating on China Eastern’s and 
China Southern’s sample routes is reported in Figure 1. The average number of airlines 
present on each route for both airlines has fallen since the mergers. Generally, China 
Eastern’s sample routes had more competitors than China Southern’s routes, which is not 
surprising given that Shanghai is the biggest commercial city in China, and routes to and 
from Shanghai should have attracted more carriers.  
The market shares of China Eastern and China Southern, as well as the Herfindahl–
Hirschman Index (HHI) at the 20 busiest airports in China from 2002 to 2004, are reported in 
Table 1. It shows that each airline’s market share at their acquired carriers’ base airports and 
the airport HHI have increased greatly since 2003, especially at Kunming for China Eastern 
and at Shenyang and Urumqi for China Southern, because these airports were previously 
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significantly dominated by the acquired carriers. China Eastern commanded a market share of 
less than 40 per cent at Shanghai Airport in 2004, while China Southern accounted for about 
50 per cent at Guangzhou Airport. Other airlines clearly had a relatively significant presence 
at both airports, and especially at Shanghai. This is consistent with the picture in Figure 1, 
which shows that on average more competitors are present in China Eastern’s sample 
markets.  
Figure 2 shows that the yield (revenue per kilometre) adjusted for inflation for China 
Eastern had been falling before the mergers.
5
 This might have been because of the collapse of 
the ―revenue pooling‖ scheme in early 2002, an overt price collusion required by CAAC 
mainly in 2000 and 2001, but not very strictly observed by all airlines on all routes.
6
 Further 
declines for both airlines appear to have occurred subsequent to the mergers, except during 
the SARS period from May to July 2003. Before October 2002, when the mergers occurred, 
there was a large difference in their yield means, and they seemed to price independently. 
Average yields from the two airlines show that their pricing patterns have become similar for 
most of the periods since the mergers (although China Eastern enjoyed higher yields again 
after April 2004), even though the routes in the two samples are not identical.  
As mentioned previously, there are 21 identical markets in the two airlines’ samples, that is, 
both airlines were present in them. Figure 3 shows the average number of passengers carried 
by China Eastern and China Southern in these markets. On average, China Eastern had a 
much lower share in terms of the passengers carried per city-pair market before the mergers, 
and the takeover of China Yunnan and China Northwest appears to have given it the 
opportunity to catch up. One reason might be that China Eastern’s competitiveness has been 
                                                 
5
 The break in the line for China Eastern is because of missing data for all of its sample routes in August 2002 
6
 Under this scheme, airlines operating on a route were required to put their sales revenue into a pool for 
reallocation, taking into account the seats actually offered, and passengers carried, by each airline. 
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strengthened through acquiring these two airlines, at least in these 21 markets. As a result, 
Figure 4 shows that the average load factors of the two airlines in 2003 and 2004 were almost 
identical. Airline sales managers have done everything possible to achieve a load level not 
less than a rival’s, as this is a key criterion in assessing the performance of a marketing team 
in China’s airline industry. it is our understanding that any difference of more than 10 per 
cent in load factors on the same route operated by any two airlines would cause an 
unavoidable price war to break out, because price competition is the only effective means that 
airlines with lower load factors can use to achieve a similar load factor to that of rival airlines.  
4. Airfare comparison methodology 
To attribute observed airfare changes to mergers, a relative fare is usually employed to 
compare the treatment group (the sample routes) with the control group (routes with similar 
distances that are not affected by the mergers) (see Kim and Singal 1993 and Singal 1996).
7
 
However, in China’s 2002 airline consolidations, a comparable group or control group is not 
easy to establish because of the small number of unaffected routes. Given the sweeping 
consolidations involving all the major airlines that have extensive networks across China, 
most of the routes in our sample have seen changes in the airlines flying these routes. This 
has left very few comparable markets from which to construct an effective control group. 
Even though there are some markets where the number of competitors and the carrier 
presence have been the same in both the pre- and post-merger periods, it is believed that the 
new airline groups would be likely to follow a different pricing strategy in these markets after 
the mergers. Notably, according to the mutual forbearance hypothesis (Edwards 1955), the 
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 Some literature uses the industry average price as a benchmark to compare the individual airline’s prices (see 
Borenstein 1990 and Borenstein and Rose 1995). Given the important dominant status of China Eastern and 
China Southern, the industry average prices would be very close to their prices. Therefore, it is not appropriate 
to use this method in this study. 
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effect of the changed multimarket contacts resulting from the airline mergers could change 
the pricing patterns in the markets where the mergers did not occur. Therefore, it is difficult 
to find a group of markets to serve as a meaningful control group. 
However, the use of the same subjects (here, the airline markets) without a control group to 
compare airfares during the periods before and after the merger is appropriate if this can be 
justified by strong evidence that the two-period data sets are comparable, and if we believe 
that fare changes in the same markets were mainly caused by merger activities (Meyer 1995).  
The preliminary discussion period for China’s airline mergers commenced in 2001 and 
ended on 11 October 2002, when the new conglomerates were formed. During this period, 
the would-be merging parties were still competing. Because the impact of a policy change is 
almost never instantaneous but requires time to be implemented, and also for reason of 
convenience, we will take 1 January 2003 as the date from which the actual mergers 
commenced and a certain degree of coordination was initiated. Before then, the merging 
parties are assumed to be competing with each other.
8
  
As mentioned earlier, full integration of the assets of the merging parties into the publicly 
listed China Eastern and China Southern was not finalised until mid-2005. In the initial 
period the component airlines operated much like an airline alliance. Members in the same 
group may have engaged in some competition against each other after their consolidations, 
especially during the SARS period, as they were still financially independent and had to 
generate cash flow to survive. Therefore, it is appropriate to say that 2003 was a transition 
period in which the joint deployment of the resources began, but it was unlikely that any 
significant efficiency gains could have been achieved at this stage. However, with the onset 
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 Although there is a time difference (two months) between the actual merging date and the assumed merger 
data, it is appropriate to assume that the integration process actually started from 1 January 2003, as it was on 
this date that the merged airlines began to use the major merging partner’s carrier code.  
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of deeper integration, internal competition should have been eliminated in 2004 with full 
schedule integration. Possible economies of scale, scope and density should have begun to 
emerge. A three-stage comparison of the average yields can be made to find out how prices 
differed between the pre-merger period (2002), the mid-merger period (2003) and the close-
to-full merger period (2004). 
This study is a short-run analysis over three years. It is believed that most costs were kept 
stable, given that the fleets had been upgraded by the end of the 1990s by switching from 
Russian-made aircraft to Boeing and Airbus models. The only possibly significant shock to 
this industry might have been the rise in fuel prices from the second half of 2004, but most 
airlines would have suffered only from early 2005, and so this rise in oil prices should not 
pose a serious problem for this study. Clearly, it should be acknowledged that we cannot 
attribute all the fare changes observed during this period to the mergers. However, once 
inflation has been controlled for, it seems that the average yields in the three periods should 
still be comparable even without a control group.
9
 It is most likely that a great part of the 
variation in fares from one period to another can be associated with the merger activities.
10
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 Inflation is adjusted for by using the national monthly Consumer Price Index (CPI) that can be found at the 
official website of National Bureau of Statistics of China, http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/.  January 2002 is taken as 
the base period. 
10
  ―The Scheme of Domestic Air Fare Reform‖ (Scheme) promulgated in 2004 was an official move to 
deregulate airfares. For the first time airlines were given the right to decide the price with a range 25 per cent 
higher and 45 per cent lower than the benchmark price. Some people may argue that this policy change could 
cause a problem in assessing the effects of the mergers. However, in fact the real purpose of this Reform 
Scheme was to set a price floor to prohibit destructive competition, as in many markets airlines had already 
discounted coach fares up to 70 per cent before the Scheme was announced. After the promulgation of the 
Scheme, airlines still priced with little reference to the lower limit. Therefore, the announcement of this Reform 
Scheme had virtually no significant effects on the airlines’ pricing (see Zhang and Round 2008). When studying 




Having justified the appropriate comparison method, the ANOVA technique, extending the 
paired t-test to more than two points in time, will be used to compare the means of the yields 
of the same group of markets in each of the three years. In the absence of any impact from 
other major events following the mergers, a significant price rise thus is likely to indicate 
increased market power and a significant decrease in price is likely to provide the evidence 
that efficiencies emerged from the mergers. However, it should be noted that efficiency 
would have been hard to achieve immediately after the mergers, especially in the semi-
integration stage of 2003. If we see a significant fall in prices in 2003, it would not be 
sensible to interpret it as the result of efficiency gains. Rather, it could be possible that 
competition was stronger than before even with a reduction in the number of competitors, 
which means that the airlines could have competed with no reference to their cost, bearing the 
loss in some markets in the short run, especially when the newly merged firms sought to 
grow their market shares and establish a market presence. This is not uncommon, even in a 
concentrated airline market where competition is still strong. This might be particularly the 
case for state-owned firms that may have multiple objectives apart from the goal of profit 
maximization. As most major Chinese airlines were only partly privatised at the end of the 
last century and the beginning of this century, some of the ideologies and goals of a state-
owned firm still probably existed in them to some extent. At times, the airlines’ behaviour 
has not conformed to that of a goal of profit-maximisation. 
However, after privatisation, there has likely been a shift towards the goal of pursuing 
maximum profits, given the pressure coming from shareholders. Therefore, we believe that 
the profit-maximisation assumption still holds in the long run. As a result, if we see a 
decrease in airfares in 2004, the close-to-full integration stage, the most likely explanation 
would be that the efficiency effect dominated the market power effect, and we could 
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conclude that the market power effect outweighed the efficiency effect if we observe a 
significant increase in prices in 2004. 
5. Results and analysis 
5.1. How have fares changed on average in China Eastern’s and China Southern’s 
sample markets? 
The yield means adjusted for inflation for China Eastern’s and China Southern’s sample 
markets for each year are presented in Table 2. For China Eastern, the results show a drop of 
some 4 per cent from 2002 to 2003, and a further slight decline in 2004. The means of China 
Southern show a slight increase in 2003, and then a drop of a little over 3 per cent in 2004. 
A one-way repeated-measures ANOVA test was conducted with the dependent variable 
being the yields in China Eastern’s sample markets, and the factor (otherwise called the 
independent variable) being the time period. The result for the within-subject effects test 
displays a significant time effect, indicating that yields were significantly affected by the 
independent variable (year periods), proxies for the influences of the pre-merger period 
(2002), the merger-in-progress period (2003), and the close-to-full merger period (2004).
11
 
Results of pairwise comparisons (not reported here) suggest that for China Eastern, the 
mean yield for 2002 was significantly different from those for 2003 and 2004, while the 
difference between 2003 and 2004 was not significant. Although we do not know what the 
competitive price is, it seems that China Eastern earned a relatively high return in its markets 
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 When repeated ANOVA measures are used, the assumption that observations are independent is frequently 
violated. For example, airfares in a given airline market in different time periods are likely to be correlated. 
Therefore, an additional assumption called sphericity is introduced. SPSS will automatically conduct the test for 
this assumption—Mauchly’s test. SPSS can generate corrections such as Huynh–Feldt (1976) correction for the 




in 2002, and that competitive pressure from Air China and China Southern pulled down its 
average airfare in 2003 and 2004. 
For China Southern, the test of within-subject effects implies a significant variation of 
yields during the three years. The pairwise comparisons indicate that the yield means in 2002 
and 2003 were not significantly different, while the decrease from 2003 to 2004 was 
statistically significant at the 1 per cent level. 
It is evident from these comparisons that neither airline seriously abused any market power 
they might have developed following the mergers. Although we do not have any evidence to 
claim that efficiency gains were achieved across the board following the mergers, and that 
these led to the decrease in prices, these results clearly show that the outcomes from the 
mergers (which occurred without any antitrust monitoring) have not been realised at the 
expense of reducing consumer welfare in general, at least over this period, in terms of the 
airfares charged. However, this is an observation that applies only across the whole sample of 
markets. It is possible that market power could have been exerted in individual markets. We 
turn now to examine some of them. 
5.2. How have fares changed on hub-to-hub markets within an airline group? 
We define a hub airport of an airline group as an airport where this group has set up a 
branch or a subsidiary company, deployed planes and occupied airport facilities. We refer to 
the airport where an airline is headquartered as its primary hub, and the rest as secondary 
hubs. A market linking an airline’s hubs (including primary hub or secondary hub) is thus 
defined as a hub-to-hub market. The two airlines’ hub-to-hub markets are listed in Table 3, 
together with their average market share each year in these markets. Markets on the same 
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route but in opposite direction (for example, Shanghai–Nanchang and Nanchang–Shanghai) 
are treated as separate markets because air pricing is directional.
12
 
 Table 4 suggests that the yield mean of China’s Eastern’s hub-to-hub markets decreased in 
2003 and then rose again in 2004 to a level higher than in 2002. The one-way repeated-
measures ANOVA with Huynh–Feldt correction suggests a significant time effect on the 
means. As merger activities and internal integration were the main factors that would have 
influenced airfares, the significant increase in 2004 indicates the possibility that market 
power was exercised by China Eastern in its hub-to-hub markets after the merger. 
Table 4 shows that in China Eastern’s non-hub-to-hub markets, yield means kept falling 
over the period and the falls were statistically significant, in contrast to the results from the 
hub-to-hub markets. China Eastern presumably charged lower prices in these markets either 
because of efficiency gains, or because of stronger competition. 
Table 4 also shows that hub-to-hub markets exhibited much higher yield means than non-
hub-to-hub markets in every time period. However, in this paper, we have sought to evaluate 
the effects of the airline mergers based on the reasonable assumption that the mergers and the 
subsequent integration were the only cause that led to the changes in airfares over time, with 
no specific intention of considering whether the hub-to-hub markets might exhibit higher 
prices than non-hub-to-hub markets. The higher yields could be because of market power 
being exercised in the hub-to-hub markets, or may simply reflect higher demand or higher 
costs in these markets. It is not wise to rely on such a simple comparison between hub-to-hub 
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 It should be noted that the airlines acquired by China Eastern (China Yunnan and China Northwest) were 
based in Kunming and Xi’an, respectively. Owing to the unavailability of data to and from these two hubs, 
Table 3 therefore mainly comprises the markets that had been China Eastern’s hub-to-hub markets before the 
mergers, and contains no hub-to-hub markets resulting from the mergers except for the Taiyuan–Kunming 
market. This is a shortcoming in the data.   
 17 
 
markets and non-hub-to-hub markets without controlling for other factors that clearly made a 
contribution to the determination of airfare levels. 
We now focus on the hub-to-hub markets of China Southern. These include markets to and 
from Shenyang and Urumqi, where the acquired airlines, China Northern and China Xinjiang, 
were based. China Southern dominated most of these markets, especially after the merger 
(see Table 3). Interestingly, the yield means in China Southern’s hub-to-hub markets (see 
Table 4) continuously declined from 2002 to 2004,
13
 although the decrease from 2002 to 
2003 was not statistically significant. It is most likely that efficiency gains occurred in these 
markets and China Southern was willing to pass them on to consumers. In contrast, the means 
in the non-hub-to-hub markets were not significantly different at the 5 per cent significance 
level, so it can be said that the means were roughly the same during the three years.
14
  This is 
in contrast to China Eastern’s pricing behaviour.  
5.3. How have fares changed in the markets departing from the airline’s primary hubs? 
There is no doubt that China Eastern had substantial influence in determining the airfares 
before and after the mergers at its primary hub, Shanghai, through its extensive sales 
channels, advertisements, and the resultant local reputation that it had established in the two 
decades prior to the mergers. This was also true for China Southern at its primary hub, 
Guangzhou. Mergers may have enforced the dominant status of the airlines in their primary 
airports, but at the same time, the simultaneous mergers also increased the ability of the 
airlines to challenge each other’s dominant status. So it is hard to predict the actual effects of 
the mergers on airfares out of these two cities. However, the ability to fix prices in these 
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 As we only retain three decimal places, Table 4 does not show the slight change from 2002 to 2003 for China 
Southern. This is also the case for Table 6 for the markets not departing from Guangzhou from 2002 to 2003. 
14




cities should have been enhanced after the mergers in these two cities due to the reduction in 
the number of parties with whom such agreements had to be negotiated. Although China 
Eastern and China Southern possessed the highest airport shares in Shanghai and Guangzhou 
respectively, Table 1 shows that their shares never exceeded 54 per cent. This indicates there 
has always been a strong presence of at least one other airline in these two airports. As a 
result, unilateral effects would seem to be less likely and coordinated effects seem to be more 
possible. In the absence of the ability to raise prices unilaterally, it could have been expected 
that it was in China Eastern’s and China Southern’s interests to keep fares as stable as 
possible through collusion in the markets out of Shanghai and Guangzhou respectively. 
Table 5 reports China Eastern’s yield means in its markets out of Shanghai. Although the 
mean yield fell from 2002 to 2003, it increased in 2004 to be roughly equal to that in 2002. 
These changes were statistically significant at the 1 per cent level. Interestingly, for its 
markets not flying out of Shanghai (including those flying to Shanghai), the yield means 
decreased steadily and significantly each year. China Eastern seems to have enjoyed the 
ability to keep airfares steady in markets from Shanghai, and at levels little lower than they 
were before the mergers occurred, but this ability appears not to have been present after the 
merger in its markets that did not involve departures from Shanghai. It is likely that it faced 
fewer constraints in pricing in its headquarters city. In fact, it was not an uncommon practice 
for the airlines to collude for the flights out of Shanghai in the years before and after the 
mergers. Our findings here reflect this fact. 
For the markets for China Southern out of Guangzhou, although there was an increase in 
mean yields from 2002 to 2003, and a decrease from 2003 to 2004, the ANOVA test results 
in Table 6 indicate that these changes were not statistically significant at the 5 per cent level. 
This suggests that mergers and the subsequent integrations did not have an obvious impact on 
China Southern’s fares. Its ability to charge higher prices appeared to be neither enhanced nor 
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weakened at Guangzhou. However, it still exercised a certain degree of influence on prices in 
the markets from Guangzhou by keeping prices relatively stable, as was the case in Shanghai 
for China Eastern. In contrast, Table 6 shows that the yield means from the markets that did 
not depart from Guangzhou decreased each year, the decrease from 2003 to 2004 being 
statistically significant, indicating that efficiency gains dominated in the close-to-full 
integration period. Similar to China Eastern, it shows a weaker ability for China Southern to 
charge higher prices after the mergers in the markets that did not depart from its primary 
hubbing airport. 
5.4. How have fares changed in markets with different market structures? 
We partitioned the sample markets of each airline into six market groups according to 
various structural characteristics of the markets before and after the mergers, and considered 
how fares changed in each group.  The definition of each group and the number of markets 
for each category is reported in Table 7. We plot the yield means of the different market 
structures in all three years in Figure 5 for China Eastern and in Figure 6 for China Southern. 
 In Figure 5, the six lines are not parallel, indicating different trends following the merger 
in the different market categories. Yields in the monopoly markets (category 1) are higher 
than those of most other categories, except in 2004 when monopoly route yields fell 
substantially, one possible reason being that the threat of potential entry by other airlines had 
increased. As there is only one market where the merger led to monopoly, shown by the line 
plot as category 2, the result might not be representative and we will not discuss it further. In 
the markets where the China Eastern mergers occurred, but at least one other rival remained 
(category 3), airfares were lower in 2003 and lower again in 2004. However, the fare changes 
from one year to the next were not statistically significant at the 5 per cent level. China 
Eastern’s airfare in the markets where the number of carriers remained constant (category 4) 
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exhibits a relatively steady pattern (the changes were not significant). This could be due to 
the fact that neither substantial market power nor significant efficiency gains might have been 
present in these circumstances, or that the two effects cancelled each other out.  
For category 5, where the number of carriers was reduced from takeovers not involving 
China Eastern, airfares fell significantly in 2003 and then remained relatively steady in 2004. 
If we believe that efficiency was hard to achieve in 2003 immediately after the merger, this 
can only be explained by the fact that there existed market power before the merger, and 
stronger competition after the mergers pushed fares down. In fact, most of the major rivals in 
this type of market were ones that were later acquired by China Southern and Air China. 
China Southern or Air China were also present in their own right but on relatively small 
scales. After the takeovers, China Eastern faced a stronger China Southern or Air China, 
leading to lower fares immediately after the mergers. It is surprising that category 6 with its 
relatively low fares could still attract new entrants after the mergers, but this entry led to a 
further lowering of fares by China Eastern in 2003 (statistically significant) and again in 2004 
(not significant). Possibly these markets were routes thought to be potentially profitable in the 
future, which the airlines sought to cultivate. In these markets, China Eastern’s airfares might 
have been more influenced by the new entry than by the merger activities, making it difficult 
to assess efficiency effects, but clearly market power has been restrained in these markets. 
For China Southern, Figure 6 shows that markets in category 1 were associated with slight 
yield rises in 2003 and 2004. Even though the change in each year was not statistically 
significant, this suggests that China Southern did not face any threat from potential entrants 
in these monopoly markets. Category 2, in which routes that were a duopoly became a 
monopoly, exhibited lower yields each year. Unlike the case of China Eastern, yields did not 
always decrease immediately after the mergers. Rather,  in categories 3, 4 and 5 they rose 
slightly in the second year but not significantly, except for category 3, and decreased 
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significantly in the third year. This is consistent with our expectations that efficiencies would 
not be achieved until some time after the mergers. No obvious market power could be 
perceived in each market group over the whole period. Category 6 exhibits a pattern that is 
quite similar to that for China Eastern, suggesting a declining trend due to new entry. 
It is worth pointing out that there were no significant fare rises in 2004 by China Eastern or 
China Southern compared with 2002 in market categories 2, 3 and 5, where there was a 
reduction in the number of competitors, and which presumably were most likely to be 
affected by the mergers. It should also be noticed that no significant rise in prices was 
observed in each period in almost all the category groups from China Eastern’s sample 
markets. It seems that neither market power effects nor efficiency gains systematically 
impacted on each type of market. However, owing to the lack of a control group, we should 
bear in mind that we cannot rule out the possibility that other factors beyond takeover 
activities might have caused the fluctuations in airfares, for example, the increasing travel 
demand from year to year,
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We need to emphasise that our attention has been restricted to assessing fare changes 
resulting from the mergers within the same groups (types) of markets, without comparing 
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 Our results for the different market groups might have been different if we had controlled for the effect of 
tourist routes. Prices on these routes should be looked at separately in future studies in order to make more 
precise inferences about the effects of market power. However, given the small number of tourist routes in our 
sample markets, it is unlikely that considering their effect would have changed our conclusion.   
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 The SARS shock in 2003 had a negative impact on demand, but it was obvious that during this period airfares 
were much higher than in any other periods. Almost all airlines charged full normal fares because of the low and 
inelastic demand resulting from the fact that all individuals and businesses cancelled their unnecessary travel, 
and there was no hope of increasing demand with lower prices. That is to say, without SARS, the average 
airfares in 2003 could have been even lower. Therefore, controlling for this variable is unlikely to change the 




fares between different types of markets. We also acknowledge the limitation of the 
methodology used to compare airfares before and after the mergers without being able to 
control for all the other possible influential factors. However, some useful conclusions on the 
effects of the mergers can still be drawn using this simple methodology. Overall, it appears 
that the Chinese airline consolidations did not result in any apparent harm to consumers, at 
least for the first two years after the event. This is somewhat surprising, especially given the 
lack of antitrust laws and oversight at this time. We suspect that what happened was the 
emergence for the first time in China of three strong airline groups who each were desperate 
to gain market share to create strong market positions, and who needed strong loads and good 
cash flows to help provide a firm financial foundation for further expansion, both in China 
and into overseas markets. 
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Table 1 Market share of China Eastern (MU) and China Southern (CZ), and HHI at China’s 20 busiest 
airports 
 Airport  MU Share (%) CZ Share (%) HHI 
2002 2003 2004 2002 2003 2004 2002 2003 2004 
1 Shanghai  27  36  38  12  19  16 1533 2209 2362 
2 Beijing  13  17  16  13  25  20 1401 2169 2233 
3 Guangzhou  11  15  13  48  54  51 2701 3351 3086 
4 Shenzhen  8  12  11  30  38  33 1823 2316 2070 
5 Chengdu  8  15  13  7  11  11 2302 2478 2343 
6 Kunming  13  64  66  10  14  14 3623 4467 4656 
7 Haikou  4  9  10  21  27  23 4093 3768 3883 
8 Xi’an  10  34  33  7  11  10 2002 2690 2695 
9 Hangzhou  17  19  17  12  22  22 1742 2201 1940 
10 Xiamen  10  13  11  12  22  18 2913 3111 3058 
11 Chongqing  6  20  21  11  16  13 1672 2020 1966 
12 Qingdao  20  25  17  11  22  21 1627 2212 2454 
13 Dalian  4  8  7  17  56  55 3733 3718 3801 
14 Nanjing  49  54  49  7  16  19 2788 3384 3011 
15 Wuhan   8  27  24  24  31  29 2431 3364 3193 
16 Shenyang  3  8  9  16  62  60 3924 4134 3917 
17 Urumqi  1  8  5  17  82  78 7834 6909 6269 
18 Changsha  8  22  21  30  40  39 1617 2524 2429 
19 Fuzhou  12  16  14  5  10  6 2930 3199 3741 
20 Guilin  8  27  24  24  30  27 1510 2057 1823 
Notes: 1. Calculated by the authors based on Timetable for Chinese Air Carriers (2002–2004), 
published by CAAC Chinese Air Carrier Timetable Press every March and October. Flight 
frequencies of all airlines out of an airport were used to calculate airport market share and airport 
HHI. 
2. These airports were in the top 20 list in terms of passenger traffic in 2004 (see China Civil Aviation 
Statistics 2005) 
 
Table 2 Means of yields (in US$) in 2002, 2003 and 2004 for China Eastern and China Southern  
 








Yield mean in 
2002 
.102 .036 916 .091 .022 769 
Yield mean in 
2003 
.098 .037 916 .092 .026 769 
Yield mean in 
2004 
.097 .041 916 .089 .230 769 
Mauchly’s test of 
sphericity  
χ2 (2) = 59.56*** χ2 (2)=34.04*** 
Test of within-
subjects effects 
F(1.89,1724.83)=41.21*** F (1.92, 1475.70) = 6.6*** 
**Significant at the 5% level. ***Significant at the 1% level. 
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Table 3 Hub-to-hub markets for China Eastern and China Southern  
 
Market 
Market share (%) 
2002 2003 2004 
China 
Eastern  
Shanghai–Nanchang/Nanchang–Shanghai  57 44 54 
Shanghai–Taiyuan/Taiyuan–Shanghai 67 49 50 
Shanghai–Wuhan/Wuhan–Shanghai 18 39 47 
Taiyuan–Kunming 67 66 93 
Shanghai–Hefei/Hefei–Shanghai 71 71 79 
Shanghai–Ningbo/Ningbo–Shanghai 48 64 89 
Shanghai–Jinan/Jinan–Shanghai 53 42 40 





100 100 100 
Guangzhou–Guiyang/Guiyang–Guangzhou 63 56 55 
Guangzhou–Haikou/Haikou–Guangzhou  48 53 56 
Guangzhou–Nanning/Nanning–Guangzhou 100 100 87 
Guangzhou–Shenyang/Shenyang–
Guangzhou 
63 100 100 
Guangzhou–Urumqi/Urumqi–Guangzhou 31 100 100 
Guangzhou–Wuhan/Wuhan–Guangzhou 70 59 54 
Guangzhou–Xiamen/Xiamen–Guangzhou 38 38 44 
Source:  Market shares were calculated by the authors based on Timetable for Chinese Air Carriers 
(2002–2004). The total seat numbers provided by each carrier in each period were used to construct 






































Yield mean in 
2002 
0.136 0.062 119 0.097 0.027 797 
Yield mean in 
2003 
0.132 0.066 119 0.093 0.027 797 
Yield mean in 
2004 
0.139 0.077 119 0.091 0.027 797 
Mauchly’s test of 
sphericity  
χ2 (2) = 19.51*** χ2 (2)=41.47*** 
Test of within-
subjects effects 
F (1.76, 207.4) = 7.67*** F (1.91, 1518.53) =60.98*** 
China 
Southern  
Yield mean in 
2002 
0.097 0.022 174 0.089 0.021 595 
Yield mean in 
2003 
0.097 0.026 174 0.090 0.026 595 
Yield mean in 
2004 
0.092 0.025 174 0.088 0.031 595 
Mauchly’s test of 
sphericity  
χ2 (2) = 10.77*** χ2 (2)=29.66*** 
Test of within-
subjects effects 
F (1.91, 329.68) =20.68*** F (1.91, 1136.30) =2.56 






Table 5 Mean yields (in US$) in MU’s markets departing and not departing from Shanghai  
 
Markets departing from Shanghai 









Yield mean in 
2002 
0.107 0.042 299 0.100 0.033 606 
Yield mean in 
2003 
0.101 0.043 299 0.096 0.034 606 
Yield mean in 
2004 
0.105 0.048 299 0.093 0.036 606 
Mauchly’s test of 
sphericity  
χ2 (2) = 87.50*** χ2 (2)=16.19*** 
Test of within-
subjects effects 
F (1.60, 476.97) =11*** F (1.96, 1182.57) =58.58*** 
**Significant at the 5% level. ***Significant at the 1% level. 
 
Table 6 Mean yields (in US$) in CZ’s markets departing and not departing from Guangzhou  
 
Markets departing from 
Guangzhou 









Yield mean in 
2002 
.091 .019 318 0.090 0.023 451 
Yield mean in 
2003 
.094 .028 318 0.090 0.024 451 
Yield mean in 
2004 
.091 .037 318 0.088 0.024 451 
Mauchly’s test of 
sphericity  
χ2 (2) = 46.91*** χ2 (2)=16.19*** 
Test of within-
subjects effects 
F (1.76, 560.00) =3.09 F (1.96, 1182.57) =58.58*** 












Table 7 Number of markets in each market category 








2 Airline mergers resulted in monopoly 
 
1 4 
3 The elimination of the acquired airline(s) resulted in 
fewer airlines, but still at least two competitors 
remained in the market 
 
5 16 
4 There was no reduction in the number of airlines in the 
market after the mergers 
 
38 18 
5 The number of competitors was reduced after the 
mergers because one or more competitors of MU/CZ 
was taken over by other airlines 
 
42 10 
6 The number of airlines increased after the mergers as a 











Source: Timetable for Chinese Air Carriers (2002–2004). 










Source: China Eastern and China Southern 





































Source: China Eastern and China Southern  

























Source: China Eastern and China Southern  


















Source: China Eastern and China Southern 





















Source: China Eastern and China Southern 
Figure 6 Yield means (in US$) in different market categories (CZ) 
 
 
 
 
